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DOMINION STORES AND LABATT
BREWERIES: SIGNALS OF A RETURN TO
THE THEORY OF PROVINCIAL RIGHTS
By HOWARD L. KUSHNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years allegations of bias in matters involving consti-
tutional issues have been made against the Supreme Court of Canada. It has
been suggested that the Supreme Court has a federalist tilt which has resulted
in decisions that have increased the scope of federal legislative powers at the
expense of provincial legislative powers. These charges have reached such a
magnitude that both academic' and judicial2 voices have responded, denying
any bias.
Against this background, it is interesting to note two recent decisions of
the Supreme Court that appear to have revived the "provincial rights"
philosophy1 so prevalent in the decisions of the Privy Council. The results of
Dominion Stores Ltd. v. The Queen4 (hereinafter Dominion Stores) and
Labatt Breweriesv. A.G. of Canada" (hereinafter Labatt's) suggest not merely
a restrictive reading of the second category of the federal "Trade and Com-
merce" power,' but also a narrow interpretation of the necessarily incidental
doctrine and the emergence of a theory of provincial paramountcy. Although
these two decisions may be applauded by those who support the provincial
rights philosophy, those who are familiar with the problems which resulted
@ Copyright, 1981, Howard L. Kushner.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Dean Lysyk and Professors D. Vaver
and R. Elliot for the valuable assistance they provided through their comments and
suggestions.
I Hogg, Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in Constitutional Cases? (1979),
57 Can. B. Rev. 721.
:"Laskin, Judicial Integrity aund the Supreme Court of Canada (1978), 12 Law
Society of Upper Canada Gazette 116.
3 By "provincial rights" I am referring to a method of interpretation which appears
primarily concerned with establishing the necessary limits of federal power in the interests
of the authority that must be conceded to the provincial governments if they are to be
able to discharge their own constitutional responsibilities. This approach may be con-
trasted with the "functional necessities" approach which attempts to develop a more
dynamic relationship between the two spheres of power by taking a more realistic
account of functional necessities. See LeDain, Sir Lyman Duff and The Constitution
(1974). 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 261 at 262.
4 (1980). 30 N.R. 399. 50 C.C.C. (2d) 277 (S.C.C.).
( 1979). 30 N.R. 496 (S.C.C.).
"The second category of the federal 'Trade and Commerce" power may be defined
as that part of the "Trade and Commerce" power which is encompassed by the phrase
"the general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion." See inira. text ac-
companying notes 44-64.
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from the Privy Council's narrow reading of the powers contained in section
91 of the British North America Act may justifiably feel that old battles once
thought to have been fought and won must now be fought again., -
The purpose of this comment is to show that all three of the above-noted
doctrinal developments are open to serious question. The restrictive reading
of the second category of the trade and commerce power results in its being
rendered effectively meaningless. The narrow interpretation given to the
"necessarily incidental" doctrine throws the law in that area into a state of
confusion. The theory of provincial paramountcy developed represents a
violent break with established doctrine. Perhaps most disturbing of all is that
these developments occurred without the careful, critical analysis one would
have expected from the Supreme Court.
II. THE CASES
The facts of Dominion Stores are relatively straightforward. The case
concerned the enforcement of the standards to be met in the marketing of
agricultural products, a matter on which both levels of government have
legislated. At the federal level, there is the Canada Agricultural Products
Standards Act,8 consisting of three parts. Part I, entitled "Standards," author-
izes the Governor in Council to make regulations establishing standards with
appropriate grade names for any class of agricultural product9 and prohibits
any person who sells, offers for sale or has in possession for sale an agricultural
product from using the grade name unless he complies with the relevant
standards.' Part II, entitled "International and Interprovincial Trade," makes
the use of the grade names mandatory for international and interprovincial
sales. Part III, entitled "Administration," permits the appointment of in-
spectors and makes it an offence to violate any provision of the Act." Thus,
in an interprovincial transaction, a seller of agricultural products must use the
federally established grade names whereas in an intra-provincial transaction,
a seller of agricultural products need not, at least under federal legislation,
adopt the federally established grade names. Should an intra-provincial seller,
however, choose to use the federally established grade names, then the seller
must comply with the standards established for the grade name.
Operating side by side with the federal legislation, there exists in Ontario,
where the marketing in question occurred, a provincial statute, the Farm
Products Grades and Sales A ct.'2 This Act and the regulations thereunder
make the use of the same federally established grade names compulsory for
the intra-provincial sale of farm products. Section 10 of the Act makes con-
- One need only read Cory. 'Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction," Royal Connission
on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Report) (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939)
• Appendix 7. to see how short a distance we have truly travelled.
R.S.C. 1970. c. A-8,
"Id., s. 3(1).
"Id., s. 3(2).
I d.. s. 130).
I" R.S.O. 1970. c. 161.
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travention of any provision of the Act or regulations an offence. Thus, dove-
tailing legislation has been enacted which requires the use of the same
standard for all sales of agricultural products, whether they be local, inter-
provincial or international in character. The charge against Dominion Stores
was that it had in its possession for sale an agricultural product (apples)
under a grade name (Canada Extra Fancy) which did not meet the standards
for that grade. The charge was laid under the federal act by federal inspectors.
Dominion Stores Ltd. successfully moved to quash the information on
the ground that Part I of the federal Act was ultra vires the federal Parliament
because it was legislation which regulated trade and commerce within the
province and thus fell within section 92(13) or 92(16) of the B.N.A. Act.
The Crown appealed to Mr. Justice Grange of the Ontario High Court, who
allowed the appeal on the ground that Part I was a valid exercise of the
Trade and Commerce power under section 91(2) of the B.N.A. Act. 13 Mr.
Justice Grange drew an analogy between the federal Parliament establishing
a national trademark "Canada Standard," the validity of which was upheld
in the Trademarks case,' 4 and the establishment of national agricultural
standards. Dominion Stores Ltd. appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal,
which upheld the decision of Mr. Justice Grange.1 The Ontario Court of
Appeal adopted the reasons of Mr. Justice Grange and in addition held that
the provisions of Part I were necessarily incidental to the effective operation
of the scheme established by "maintaining the integrity of the national
standards grade and to prevent the misuse of the grade and confusion."10
Dominion Stores Ltd. then applied for and was granted leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada. The constitutional question fixed by order
of Mr. Justice Pigeon was: "Is Part I of the Canada Agricultural Products
Standards Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-8, ultra vires in whole or in part?" T The
Supreme Court of Canada in a 5-4 split8 reversed the Ontario Court of
Appeal and held that the federal act was inapplicable to local sales. It is
not entirely clear if the majority held the legislation to be ultra vires and
therefore inapplicable or merely inapplicable.' 9 Mr. Justice Estey, speaking
for the majority, rejected the analogy drawn between "Canada Standard" and
"Canada Extra Fancy." Although the former fell within the second category
of trade and commerce, the latter, he said, did not. He also held that the
necessarily incidental doctrine could not be applied to federal legislation that
13 (1978), 17 O.R. (2d) 168, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 627, 37 C.C.C. (2d) 20 (H.C.).
14 A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., [1937] A.C. 405, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 702, 67 C.C.C. 342.
In this case the Privy Council upheld federal legislation establishing a national trademark
as being within the class of subjects enumerated in s. 91(2). For a further discussion, see
infra, text accompanying notes 30-43.
15 (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 496, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 266, 39 C.C.C. (2d) 127 (C.A.).
16 Id. at 497 (O.R.), 267 (D.L.R.), 128 (C.C.C.).
"7 Supra note 4, at 402 (N.R.), 285 (C.C.C.).
18 The majority decision was delivered by Estey J. with Martland, Pigeon, Beetz and
Pratte JJ. concurring. Laskin C.J.C. delivered the dissent with Ritchie, Dickson and
McIntyre JJ. concurring.
19 See infra, text accompanying notes 82-103.
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affected local trade..- Further, he appeared to adopt a doctrine of provincial
paramountcy, determining the applicability of federal legislation by the
existence of provincial legislation. The Chief Justice, speaking for the
minority, held that the second category of trade and commerce applied to
"Canada Extra Fancy" in the same manner as it applied to "Canada
Standard." The Chief Justice rejected the application of the necessarily
incidental doctrine but for different reasons than those of Mr. Justice Estey.
As to the existence of a doctrine of provincial paramountcy, the Chief Justice
left the matter open.21
Approximately one week after the judgment in Dominion Stores was
delivered, the Supreme Court in Labatt's'-- had another opportunity to discuss
the scope of the second category of trade and commerce and its application
to commodity standards legislation. The case involved the use by the plain-
tiff of the label "Labatt's Special Lite" for a beer that did not qualify as a
"light beer," a grade standard defined in a regulation23 passed under the
Food and Drugs Act.2 4 Labatt Breweries was seeking a declaration that the
label "Special Lite" was not misleading. The brewery was successful at trial
before the Federal Court of Canada,2 but the decision was reversed by the
Federal Court of Appeal..2 6 The brewery appealed to the Supreme Court
where it argued first that the name "Special Lite" was not likely to be mis-
taken for a "light beer" and second, that the federal act and regulations
thereunder which established standards for "light beer" were ultra vires the
Parliament of Canada.
Before the Supreme Court, Labatt Breweries was unsuccessful on the
first issue -7 but was successful on the constitutional argument. Mr. Justice
Estey, again speaking for a majority of the Court, 28 held that the second
category of the trade and commerce power could only apply where the matter
in question is of general interest throughout the Dominion and has no
application to the marketing and production of goods for sale. He also
rejected the arguments advanced by the Attorney General of Canada which
were based on the peace, order and good government power and the criminal
law power.29 Mr. Justice Pigeon, in his dissent, upheld the validity of the
regulation under the second category of the trade and commerce power, on the
2 0 Supra note 4, at 411-12 (N.R.), 293-94 (C.C.C.).
21 Id. at 421 (N.R.), 284 (C.C.C.).
2 2 Supra note 5.
23 Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 870, regs. B.02.130[S], B.02.134[S].
24 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27.
2. (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 61 (F.C.).
26 (1979), 26 N.R. 617 (F.C.A.).
27 Supra note 5, at 526. Only Mr. Justice Ritchie found the label "Special Lite"
was not misleading.
28 The majority decision was delivered by Estey J. with Martland, Dickson, Beetz
and Pratte JJ. concurring. Ritchie J. delivered a separate judgment but concurred with
Estey J. on the constitutional issues. Pigeon J. delivered a dissent with McIntyre J. con-
curring. Laskin C.J.C. delivered a separate dissent.
29 This comment does not deal with the peace, order and good government or
criminal law arguments advanced on behalf of the federal government.
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basis that, from a constitutional law point of view, there was no difference
between legislation which established the standards "light beer" and "Canada
Standard." The Chief Justice in his dissenting judgment held that the legisla-
tion and regulations were intra vires the federal Parliament. He based his
decision on the existence of a federal trade power which was not limited to
the international or interprovincial marketing of goods.
III. TRADEMARKS v. COMMODITY STANDARDS
Dominion Stores provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
resolve an issue that has intrigued trademark lawyers: what is the nature and
function of a trademark? Is it intended to indicate the "source or origin" of
the goods distributed in association with the mark or is it an indication of
the quality or characteristics of the goods sold in association with the mark?
Is a trademark to be regarded "as a species of property including the right
of disposition on the part of its owner; as a limited species of property as
indicating origin and, hence, as something in which the public has an interest;
or that it is property serving, not as an indication of origin, but as a
guarantee of quality?"3 Although one may forgive the Court for its refusal
to resolve this crucial and difficult question in a case involving agricultural
product standards, the Court cannot be forgiven for its refusal to discuss the
relationship between a national trademark, such as "Canada Standard," and
a national commodity standard, such as "Canada Extra Fancy."
In the Trademarks case,-1 the Privy Council, on appeal from the
Supreme Court, was asked whether the 1935 Dominion Trade and Industry
Commission Act 32 was ultra vires the Parliament of Canada. The Supreme
Court had unanimously held that sections 14, 18 and 19 were ultra vires. 3
Sections 18 and 19 of that Act provided that the words "Canada Standard"
or initials "C.S." were a national trademark vested in Her Majesty in right
of the Dominion of Canada. This mark could only be used under the pre-
scribed conditions, including the condition that the commodity to which such
trademark was applied should conform to the requirements of a commodity
standard established under the provisions of an act of Parliament. However,
as stated by the Supreme Court in that case, this so-called "trademark" was
not a trademark in any proper sense of the term as it was understood in 1935.
At that time a trademark was viewed as an indicator of the origin of goods
placed on the market, and the protection given to a trademark was intended
to be a protection to the producer or seller of the goodwill in his business and
of his reputation in his trade.:31 The function of the initials "C.S." as declared
by section 18(1) was something entirely different. The application of the
30 Fox. The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition (3d cd.
Toronto: Carswell, 1972) at 262.
:1 Supra note 14.
32 S.C. 1935, c. 59.
33 [1936] S.C.R. 379. [1936] 3 D.L.R. 607. 66 C.C.C. 177.
34 As a result of legislative amendments which permit the use of certification marks
and allow the licensing of trademarks (see the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970. c. T-10,
ss. 23-25, 49) it may be argued that the "origin" function of trademarks is no longer
the sole or even primary function of a trademark.
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initials "C.S." to a commodity represented that the commodity met the
standards prescribed for that commodity. Section 19(1) permitted any
producer, manufacturer, or merchant to apply the national trademark to any
commodity produced, or manufactured, or sold by him provided that the
commodity conformed to the appropriate statutory qualifications. Section
19(2) made it a criminal offence to apply the mark to any commodity which
did not meet the statutory qualifications. The Privy Council upheld the
validity of sections 18 and 19, holding that the sections were within section
91(2) of the B.N.A. Act: regulation of trade and commerce.35 It is submitted
that this peculiar type of mark serves neither an "origin function" nor a
"property function," but rather is of the nature of a commodity standard, by
which the quality of an item is guaranteed through the use of a defined
designation. 6
A comparison of trademarks, certification marks and the "C.S." des-
ignation reveals a transfer of concern from product origin to product quality.
The current view of trademarks, put forward by the Department of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs in their working paper on trademark law revision,
7
is that a trademark is not an indicator of product quality but rather is an
indicator of the legal entity which has an economic interest in ensuring that
products distributed in association with the trademark will continue to possess
satisfactory characteristics. The trademark owner has, if not complete free-
dom, certainly a large measure of discretion to vary the quality of an item
sold under the mark.38 The product quality control on a trademark is es-
sentially regulated by the marketplace: a lowering of product quality may
well result in a corresponding decrease in the value of the trademark. The
"C.S." designation differs from a regular trademark in that the control placed
upon "C.S." is not upon the person who may use the mark but rather on the
quality of the product sold under the mark. By government regulation
standards are established for the "C.S." designation of any item. This makes
the "C.S." designation more comparable to a certification mark than a
trademark. A certification mark is used to distinguish wares or services of a
defined standard from wares or services that are not of that standard.""
Certification marks are registered with the Registrar of Trade Marks, and a
change in the defined standard requires filing an amendment with the
:1 The present equivalents of ss. 18 and 19 of the Dominion Trade and Industry
Commission Act, S.C. 1935, c. 59 are ss. 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the National Trade Mark and
True Labelling Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-16.
:6 At the present time regulations passed pursuant to the National Trade Mark and
True Labelling Act, id., establish standards for a variety of items including: measuring
cups, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1136, babcock test bottles C.R.C. 1978, c. 1135, and jewelled
watches C.R.C. 1978, c. 1141.
37 Dep't of Cons. & Corp. Affairs, Working Paper on Trade Mark Law Revision
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974).
38 The exact extent of a trademark owner's discretion to vary the quality of his
goods is not entirely clear. See Wilkinson Sword (Canada) Ltd. v. Juda (1967), 34 Fox
Pat. C. 77. 51 C.P.R. 55 (Ex.). See also Hanak. The Quality Assurance Function of
Trademarks (1975), 65 The Trade Mark Rptr. 318.
:01 For a recent discussion of the nature of certification marks see The Wool Bureau
of Canada v. Queenswear (Canada) Ltd. (1980). 47 C.P.R. (2d) 11 at 15-16 (F.C.).
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Registrar. Thus, a certification mark has aspects of "product quality" control
in that the mark indicates a specified standard which cannot be varied as easily
as a trademark. Although the certification mark is registered with a govern-
ment official, the government neither establishes minimum standards nor tests
the items to ensure that the items conform to the standard. A certification
mark also has an "origin" function in that the owner of a certification mark
determines by means of a licensing scheme who may use the mark.40 The
"C.S." designation differs from a certification mark in that no "origin" control
is imposed but rather a "product quality" test is adopted.
Another difference between trademarks, certification marks and "C.S."
is found in the means adopted to ensure that the designation in question is
not misused. For both trademarks and certification marks, redress is by way
of civil action under the Trade Marks Act or by way of the common law
action of passing off.41 With respect to the "C.S." designation, criminal pro-
ceedings may be brought by the Attorney General should the initials be
misused. 42
These differences indicate that the "Canada Standard" designation is very
similar to a commodity standard designation such as "Canada Extra Fancy."
Both establish a national standard, signified by a national name which traders,
at least on a local level, may choose to use and which, if improperly used,
subjects the trader to penal sanctions. This similarity was noted by the Chief
Justice in Dominion Stores and by Mr. Justice Pigeon in Labatt's.43 Mr.
Justice Estey's dismissal of the similarities of "Canada Standard" and "Canada
Extra Fancy" on the basis that "Canada Standard" is a trademark mis-
construes the nature of both designations. The same function is served by
both designations, and a similar method of enforcement is adopted. To find
one designation to be within the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament and the
other not on the basis of the use of the phrase "trademark" is to elevate form
over substance and permits Parliament to determine the constitutional validity
of its own actions. The similarity in function, purpose and penalty suggests
that the legislative authority which authorizes Parliament to create "Canada
Standard" should also authorize it to create "Canada Extra Fancy" or "Light
Beer."
IV. GENERAL REGULATION OF TRADE
If "Canada Standard" or "Canada Extra Fancy" or "Light Beer" were
to be upheld under section 91 (2) with respect to local transactions without
relying on the application of the necessarily incidental doctrine, they would
have to be supported under the second category of "trade and commerce,"
the general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion. This category,
40 This "origin" function may become even less significant if the proposed amend-
ments to the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10 contained in the Senate Bill S-11,
1978-79 (30th Parliament, 4th sess.) are passed. See especially s. 21 of the proposed
amendments.
41 Fox, supra note 30, chs. IX, XII.
4 2 National Trade Mark and True Labelling Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-16, s. 8.
43 Supra note 4, at 417-18 (N.R.), 281-82 (C.C.C.) and supra note 5, at 533,
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like the first, has its origins in the case of Citizens Insurance Company of
Canada v. Parsons4 4 wherein the Privy Council indicated that if no restraint
were placed upon the phrase "regulation of trade and commerce," it would
permit Parliament to enact "minute rules for regulating particular trades,"
45
severely restricting (if not emasculating) any provincial power over local
trade. Thus, the phrase was interpreted to include merely "political arrange-
ments in regard to trade requiring the sanction of Parliament, regulation of
trade in matters of interprovincial concern, and it may be ... general
regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion," 46 leaving the regulation
of local trade to the Provinces under sections 92(13) or 92(16) of the B.N.A.
Act. Although the second branch of 91(2) has seldom been invoked suc-
cessfully by the federal government, it has not been completely ignored. The
general power was sufficient to permit the federal Parliament to establish a
national trademark and to "prescribe to what extent the powers of companies
the objects of which extend to the entire Dominion should be exercisable, and
what limitations should be placed on such powers. '47 Acknowledgment of
this "general power to regulate trade" is also found in Bank of Toronto v.
Lambe,48 Hodge v. The Queen,49 Toronto Electric Comm'rs v. Snider5 and in
Reference Re Natural Products Marketing Act.51 Yet even in those cases
which recognized the existence of the second branch of 91(2), there was no
attempt to properly delineate the scope of the power. 52 This failure to define
the scope of the second category continued up until the mid-1970's. Only
recently, in two judgments delivered by Chief Justice Laskin, has there been
an attempt to give the second category some content. In the Anti-Inflation Act
Reference the Chief Justice, by way of obiter dicta, specifically referred to
"the general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion" as a head of
power which would justify the introduction of a policy of restraint to combat
inflation. "3 Subsequently, in MacDonald v. Vapour Canada, speaking for a
44 (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96.
45 Id. at 112.
46Id. at 113.
47 John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 at 340, 18 D.L.R. 353 at 360,
7 W.W.R. 706 at 715 (P.C.).
48 (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 at 586 (P.C.).
49 (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 at 131 (P.C.).
50 [1925] A.C. 396 at 409-10, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5 at 12-13, [1925] 1 W.W.R. 785 at
792-93 (P.C.).
51 [1936] S.C.R. 398 at 410, afl'd [1937] A.C. 377.
52 Even in the Parsons case, supra note 44, at 113, the Privy Council abdicated its
role of deciding the scope of the second category when Sir Montague Smith stated:
Having taken this view of the present case, it becomes unnecessary to consider
the question how far the general power to make regulations of trade and
commerce, when completely exercised by the Dominion parliament, might
legally modify or affect property and civil rights in the provinces, or the
legislative power of the provincial legislatures in relation to those subjects.
[Emphasis added.]
It is no wonder that Estey J., in Labatt's, supra note 5, referred to the phrase "general
regulation of trade" as a mere afterthought.
53 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 at 426-27, 9 N.R. 541 at 590, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 at 498-99.
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majority of the Court, he suggested that unless a federal act fulfilled the
following conditions it could not be upheld under the second category of
91(2):
(1) the impugned section of an Act was part of a regulatory scheme
administered by a federally appointed agency, and
(2) the enforcement of the scheme was not left to the chance of private
redress without public monitoring by the continuous oversight of
a regulatory agency.
5 4
In Dominion Stores, neither the judgment of Mr. Justice Estey, nor the
dissent of the Chief Justice truly addresses the issue of the proper scope of the
second category of 91(2). Both judgments accept the authority of the Privy
Council's Trademarks decision but either distinguish the case on its facts
(Mr. Justice Estey) or apply the case without any discussion of the tests to
apply (Chief Justice Laskin). It is submitted that neither approach is satis-
factory. To distinguish the Trademarks case on the basis of factual distinctions
is to misconstrue the true nature of the "national" trademark; for, as has
been indicated above, what was actually created by the Dominion Trade and
Industry Commission Act was a commodity standard for manufactured goods.
To simply apply the case without a discussion of the scope of the second
category of 91 (2) is to continue the court's failure to define the proper role of
the second category.
Shortly after the decision in Dominion Stores was handed down, the
Supreme Court, in Labatt's, had another opportunity to discuss the scope of
the second category of trade and commerce and its application to commodity
standards legislation. Mr. Justice Estey, speaking for a majority of the Court,
stated that the test to determine whether the second category of the trade and
commerce power applies is whether the matter is a question of general interest
throughout the Dominion. However, he qualified this test by stating that
(1) the regulation of a single trade or industry is not of general national
concern regardless of whether it is a national company,
(2) the regulation of the elements of commerce such as contracts of an
individual trade is not of general national concern, and
(3) unrestricted geographic play of an Act is not sufficient.i 5
Mr. Justice Estey made no reference to the Chief Justice's comments in
MacDonald v. Vapour Canada regarding federal agencies and federal en-
forcement.
An additional complication in the interpretation of the second category
of 91(2) arises out of the relationship between transactions involving the
"marketing" of goods and the scope of the first category of 91(2). Attempts
to uphold federal legislation which dealt with trade and commerce in a non-
.4 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 at 164-67, 66 D.L.R. (3d) I at 25-27, 22 C.P.R. (2d) I at
27-30. For a comment on the tests proposed by Laskin C.J.C. and the case generally, see
Hogg, Comment (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 361.
M, Supra note 5, at 517-18.
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marketing sense were consistently rebuffed by the Privy CounciP 6 as not
falling within either category of 91(2). Any marketing legislation which has
been upheld under 91(2) has been characterized as being legislation within
the first category of 91(2). Thus, marketing legislation has been excluded
from the concept of general regulation of trade. Further, control of production
is seen as being prima facie a matter of provincial jurisdiction and therefore
not within the scope of 91(2),57 apparently on the assumption that since
production occurs at a local level, it could not be a matter of general interest.
Consequently, the second category of 91(2) has no application to production
and marketing legislation. The first and second categories of 91 (2) are seen as
being mutually exclusive. This perception of the limited scope of 91(2) raises
two questions: first, why must the second category of 91(2) be read so
restrictively as to exclude "marketing legislation", and second, how does
one establish whether legislation which establishes commodity standards in
respect of goods to be marketed is "marketing legislation" or "labelling
legislation"? Each of these questions will be addressed in turn.
As indicated earlier, the historical justification for a restricted inter-
pretation of the scope of 91 (2) has been the fear that to interpret the words
"regulation of trade and commerce" literally would deny the provinces any
power over local trade. Thus, the basis of the interpretation is rooted in the
"provincial rights" philosophy, as a means of preserving local autonomy. Yet
if one were to approach the interpretation of section 91(2) from a different
constitutional law perspective, for example co-operative federalism or
functional necessities, one might well interpret section 91(2) differently. It
is submitted that the dissent of the Chief Justice in Labatt's reflects a con-
stitutional view concerned with preserving a national power with respect to
trade which would not be limited to the marketing of goods. Nor should the
Chief Justice be criticized for presenting his view, for it merely reflects a
different perception of Canada than that adopted by the Privy Council (and
apparently by Mr. Justice Estey). Unfortunately, the Chief Justice does not
indicate the scope of the second category of section 91(2), nor does he
indicate the test to be used to determine if federal legislation falls within the
second category. In his dissenting judgment in Labatt's, the Chief Justice
supports the validity of compulsory commodity standards legislation, not on
the basis of a scheme of public control in association with a regulatory
authority, a route suggested in MacDonald v. Vapour Canada, but on the basis
that the legislation is a method of equalizing competitive advantages for
businesses concerned with the manufacture of food, drugs, cosmetics and
therapeutic devices. 58 No case authority is cited by the Chief Justice to sup-
port his interpretation of section 91 (2) other than a reference to comments
5 E.g., regulation of insurance, A.G. Can. v. A.G. Alta. (Insurance Reference),
[1916] 1 A.C. 588, 26 D.L.R. 288, 10 W.W.R. 405 (P.C.); combines legislation, Re Bd.
of Commerce Act, 1919 & Combines & Fair Prices Act, 1919 (Bd. of Commerce),
[1922] 1 A.C. 191, 60 D.L.R. 513, [1922] 1 W.W.R. 20; and labour relations, Toronto
Electric Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
57 In Labatt's, supra note 5, at 516, Estey J. adopts the comments of Pigeon J. in
Re Agricultural Products (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at 324.
58 Supra note 5, at 537.
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in the Board of Commerce case in which the Privy Council indicated that
Parliament could acquire statistical information on trade activities." Thus,
one is no further ahead as a result of the Chief Justice's judgment than one
was with the 1937 Privy Council decision on trademarks. However, if one
adopts the reasoning of Estey J., then the second category of 91 (2) is a mere
afterthought, to be given little if any effect; °" the phrase "regulation of trade
and commerce" in 91 (2) would be read as the regulation of the inter-
provincial or international marketing of goods and the Trademarks case
stands as an unexplained anomaly.
Although the different interpretations of the second category of 91 (2)
adopted by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Estey may derive from differing
views on their role in interpreting the constitution (provincial rights, co-
operative federalism, functional necessities), both the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Estey seem inclined to the view that marketing legislation should be
treated as coming exclusively within the first category of 91 (2).61 Why that
is so is never made clear. Could not some product locally produced or manu-
factured be an item of concern to the Dominion as a whole, for example the
mining and marketing of uranium? Certainly the declaratory power in section
92(10) (c) indicates that the "local" existence of a work does not preclude the
work from having national importance. The Parsons case itself recognized
the "double aspect" doctrine by suggesting that the general power when
properly exercised could affect property and civil rights in a province.
Possibly no situation has arisen where a matter of general interest to the
Dominion has existed with respect to local production or marketing. Yet the
Court's analysis seems to preclude the application of the second category in
all future cases.
A second question which arises, if the authority of the Trademarks case
is to be maintained, is how one distinguishes between "agricultural products
standards," "food products standards," "drug products standards" and
"manufactured products standards" legislation. The latter has been declared
intra vires the federal Parliament under section 91(2) by the Privy Council;
the other three, as a result of the Labatt's and Dominion Stores cases, have
been declared ultra vires in so far as intra-provincial transactions are con-
cerned on the basis that such legislation is "marketing" legislation. No satis-
factory distinction is given in Dominion Stores, but in Labatt's both Mr.
Justice Estey and Mr. Justice Pigeon attempt to explain the difference. One
route, suggested by Mr. Justice Estey, is to distinguish between labelling
legislation and marketing legislation. Any legislation which goes beyond
59 Id.
60 Supra note 52.
o1 See the Chief Justice's comments in MacDonald, supra note 54, at 163 (S.C.R.),
24 (D.L.R.), 27 (C.P.R.), where in reference to the federal trade and commerce power,
he states:
The bearing they [the marketing cases] do have, however, is in indicating that
regulation by a public authority, taking the matter in question out of private
hands, must still meet a requirement, if federal regulatory legislation is to
be valid, of applying the regulation to the flow of interprovincial or foreign
trade.
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requiring disclosure of contents to prescribing standards and the maintaining
of some scheme of quality control is characterized as marketing legislation.
62
In essence, legislation which establishes a scheme of quality control is
marketing legislation. Yet this distinction does not adequately explain the
Trademarks case which established a national commodity standard by pre-
scribing standards for certain manufactured goods. Another basis of dis-
tinction may lie in the product to be labelled; namely food versus a
manufactured item. Yet Mr. Justice Pigeon, in his dissent, rejects this line
of reasoning by stating that no distinction could be drawn between the legis-
lation at issue in the Trademarks case and those sections of the Food and
Drugs Act which establish standards,63 and both are valid under section
91(2). Another distinction could be between a scheme which is compulsory
in nature versus a scheme which is voluntary. Yet the scheme closest to
being compulsory was the food and drugs legislation that established quality
standards for a variety of beers and prohibited the sale of beer that did
not meet the prescribed standards, and Mr. Justice Pigeon upheld the
legislation. The distinction seized upon by Mr. Justice Pigeon, by which
the Agricultural Products Standards Act became ultra vires, was the exis-
tence of similar provincial legislation. Since provincial "commodity stan-
dards" legislation would appear to be valid as being legislation in relation
to local transactions, and since local transactions come within the concept of
intra-provincial marketing, the federal legislation must be legislation in
relation to intra-provincial marketing. If this is the reasoning adopted by
Mr. Justice Pigeon, it ignores the "double aspect" doctrine and permits
federal legislation to be characterized and declared ultra vires on the basis
of the existence of provincial legislation, suggesting a concept of provincial
paramountcy.64
The results of the Dominion Stores and Labatt's cases suggest that,
contrary to the Trademarks case, the Federal Parliament has no jurisdiction
to establish commodity standards for items produced or marketed within a
province. The second category of section 91(2) has no application to either
the production or marketing of goods. Any implication that one might have
drawn from the majority decision in Vapour Canada that the general trade
and commerce power has some substantive content has apparently been
refuted. The majority of the Court did not perceive any need to maintain a
federal power to encourage and assist in the development of a national
economy, but rather adopted an analysis which weakens the federal power
over the national economy. In pursuit of provincial rights, the second
category of 91(2) has been reduced in content to a lesser state than that
in which it existed prior to Dominion Stores.
V. NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL DOCTRINE
As noted above, the second category of 91(2) was not the only basis
upon which the legislation in the Dominion Stores case could have been
62 Supra note 5, at 522.
63 Id. at 532. Pigeon J. states, "I fail to see how this difference can be significant
from a constitutional point of view."
64 See infra, text accompanying notes 82-103.
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upheld. The necessarily incidental doctrine could also have been used to
reach this result. As stated by Brooke J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal:
In our view, the pith and substance of this legislation is the regulation of export
and interprovincial trade. We think the provisions of Part I, sec. 3(2) are neces-
sarily incidental to the effective operation of the scheme established by main-
taining the integrity of national standards grade and to prevent the misuse of
the grade and confusion. 63) [Emphasis added.]
This approach was, however, rejected by both Mr. Justice Estey and Chief
Justice Laskin. Estey J. referred to The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevators Co.
as establishing that Parliament is not empowered to regulate local trade
simply as part of a scheme for the regulation of international and inter-
provincial trade. 6 Laskin C.J.C. appeared to accept the argument advanced
by Dominion Stores that:
in view of the existence of the Farm Products Grades and Sales Act. R.S.O.
1970 C. 161 covering intra-provincial transactions, and which was therefore valid
provincial legislation under governing case law, Part I could not be swept into the
provisions governing export and international trade as being "necessarily inciden-
tal" under the line of authority dealing with that concept.
0 7
It is submitted that this summary dismissal of the application of the
necessarily incidental doctrine was both unfortunate and possibly without
foundation. It is unfortunate because it is a doctrine often stated as a basis
for upholding legislation but rarely with any reasons given. In fact, it is used
more often as a statement of a conclusion which automatically results in a
decision upholding (or denying) the validity of challenged legislation. Its
dismissal may be without foundation due to the following comments by the
Supreme Court in the Trademarks case:
If confined to external trade and inter-provincial trade the section [section 14,
which provided that an agreement between persons engaged in any specific in-
dustry, entered into in order to modify wasteful or demoralizing competition exist-
ing in such industry, may be approved by the Governor General in Council] might
well be competent under head No. 2 of section 91; and if the legislation were in
substance concerned with such trade, incidental legislation in relation to local
trade necessary in order to prevent the defeat of competent provisions might also
be competent .... us
Applying similar reasoning to Dominion Stores, if section 3 of the Agricultural
Products Standards Act could be seen as being necessary in order to prevent
the defeat of valid provisions regarding interprovincial and export trade, by
protecting and preserving the integrity of national standards, and yet at the
same time permit the use of a national standard in local trade, then section
3 (2) ought to have been found to be intra vires the federal Parliament.
The "necessarily incidental doctrine," which is sometimes seen as being
equivalent to the "ancillary doctrine," has been defined as follows:
65 Supra note 15, at 497 (O.R.), 267 (D.L.R.) 127 (C.C.C.).
66 [1925] S.C.R. 434, [1925] 3 D.L.R. I cited supra note 4, at 402-403 (N.R.), 286
(C.C.C.).
07 Id. at 419 (N.R.), 282-83 (C.C.C.). Quaere what line of authority is the Chief
Justice relying on?
c8 Supra note 33, at 382 (S.C.R.), 608 (D.L.R.), 178-79 (C.C.C.).
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Provisions in a Dominion statute 9 which directly intrude upon provincial classes
of jurisdiction and which, standing alone, would be incompetent to the Dominion,
may nevertheless be valid as being necessarily incidental to full-rounded legislation
upon a Dominion subject-matter, or to the effective exercise of an enumerated
Dominion power, or to prevent the scheme of an otherwise valid Act from being
defeated.70
Accepting the above definition of "necessarily incidental," how does
one determine whether a particular section of an act falls within the scope
of the necessarily incidental doctrine? Chief Justice Laskin had an opportunity
to comment upon this when he was a member of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
In the case of Papp v. Papp7 ' an issue arose as to the validity of those
provisions of the federal Divorce Act which related to the custody of
children whose parents were involved in a divorce proceeding. Laskin J.A.
said:
I do not myself favour the language of "trenching" and of "necessarily incidental"
or "ancillary", found in the two Privy Council cases and through which effectuation
of exercises of federal legislative power have been certified. Convenient as that
language may be to signal situations in which the doctrine of exclusiveness of
jurisdiction does not apply but that there is rather a legislative field with gates of
entry for both Dominion and Province, it is not sufficiently neutral in its
acknowledgement of a common domain. The terse phraseology of the grants of
legislative power does not fall to be measured by dictionary meaning alone. The
Constitution is a working instrument addressed to legislative bodies, and its
implementation in legislation must be seen as a social assessment by the enacting
body of the scope of the power which is invoked in any particular case. Where
there is admitted competence, as there is here, to legislate to a certain point, the
question of limits (where that point is passed) is best answered by asking whether
there is a rational functional connection between what is admittedly good and what
is challenged.
the legislation must be taken as a whole and evaluated from the standpoint of its
coherency as an integrated federal scheme.72 [Emphasis added.]
The test of whether there is a rational, functional connection between
what is admittedly good and what is challenged was referred to and apparently
adopted by the Supreme Court in Zacks v. Zacks.7 3 Accepting it to be the
correct test, one then ought to look at the Agricultural Products Standards Act
as a whole, evaluated from a standpoint of its coherency as an integrated
federal scheme. It is submitted that in addition to establishing product
standards for inter provincial and export trade (clearly within section 91 (2)),
( There is some doubt whether this doctrine applies to provincial legislation. See the
comments of Laskin C.J.C. in A.G. Quebec v. Kellogg's Co., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 211 at 216-17,
19 N.R. 271 at 275-76, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 314 at 316-17; but see Ladore v. Bennett, [1939]
A.C. 468, 3 D.L.R. 1, 2 W.W.R. 566 (P.C.), wherein the doctrine is applied to provincial
legislation.
70 Clement, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, quoted by MacDonald, Judicial
Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution (1935-36), 1 U. Toronto L.J. 260 at 273-74.
Early applications of this doctrine are seen in the judgments of Lord Herschell in A.G.
Ont. v. A.G. Can. (Voluntary Assignments), [1894] A.C. 189 at 200-201, and of Lord
Watson in A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., [1896] A.C. 348 at 359-60.
71 [1970] 1 O.R. 331, 8 D.L.R. (3d) 389 (C.A.).
72 Id. at 335-36 (O.R.), 393-94 (D.L.R.).
.3 [1973J S.C.R. 891 at 904, 35 D.L.R. (3d) 420 at 429, 10 R.F.L. 53 at 63.
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an additional purpose of the legislation was to facilitate the establishment of
a uniform national standard in order to assist the producer, seller and pur-
chaser of agricultural products. Obviously, what is important in any such
scheme is the maintenance of the uniformity and integrity of the standard.
Certainly section 3 (1) of the Act, wherein local producers and sellers are
permitted but not compelled to adopt these standards, and section 3(2),
wherein the integrity of the standard is maintained, would appear to be
within the test laid out in Papp v. Papp. Possibly compulsory legislation, in
the intra-provincial sphere, would overstep the requirements of a rational
functional test. However, this analysis, based upon a "rational functional
connection," was not adopted by the Court.
Mr. Justice Estey's judgment, wherein he relies on a number of cases
decided in the 1920's and 1930's offers a historical but questionable treatment
of the necessarily incidental doctrine. He fails to discuss the more recent
marketing cases such as Re Farm Products Marketing Act, 74 Murphy v.
C.P.R. 'a and the Queen v. Klassen,Th in which a more functional 7 interpre-
tation of the power of the federal Parliament to regulate local trade under
section 91(2) is adopted. Mr. Justice Rand in the Farm Products case
recognized that regulation of particular trades lies exclusively within the
legislative jurisdiction of the provinces subject to such incidental intrusion
by the Dominion as may be necessary to prevent the defeat of Dominion
regulation. This functional approach was expanded in The Queen v. Klassen,
in which federal legislation which restricted the right of local wheat growers
to ship their wheat to local elevators was upheld on the basis that it was
necessary in order to ensure the orderly marketing of the grain and maintain
the quota system. Are these cases no longer reflective not only of the approach
but also of the attitude which the Court will adopt in respect of federal
legislation which affects local transactions? Does the reliance on King v.
Eastern Terminal Elevators suggest a return to the watertight compartments
and the restricted interpretation of section 91(2), so characteristic of the
Privy Council era?
The Chief Justice's apparent rejection of the necessarily incidental
doctrine on the basis of similar or identical provincial legislative provisions
appears to conflict not only with the approach taken but also the result
reached in Papp v. Papp, in which "custody legislation" existed at both the
federal and provincial level. How does "similar" provincial legislation affect
the rational functional connection test? Is it being suggested that if similar
legislation exists at both levels then the existence of a need for federal legis-
lation disappears? Is it being suggested that in order to establish that a need
exists for federal legislation, the federal authorities must show a need not
merely on the theoretical level but also in actuality? There may be some
authority in support of this latter proposition that the "necessarily incidental"
doctrine requires an actual need for legislation, not merely a theoretical need.
74 [1957] S.C.R. 198, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257.
75[1958] S.C.R. 626, 15 D.L.R. (2d) 445, 77 C.R.C. 322.
76 (1960), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 406, 29 W.W.R. 369, 31 C.R. 275 (Man. C.A.).
77 See Laskin, (1959), Comment, 37 Can. B. Rev. 630.
[VOL. 19, NO. I
Provincial Rights
In Browne's book, The Judicial Committee and The British North America
Act, the author, in discussing various interpretative doctrines adopted by the
Privy Council when interpreting the B.N.A. Act, refers to the "Ancillary
Doctrine" and states that "in these judgments [Montreal v. Montreal Street
Railivay-N and Fish Canneries case79] Lord Atkinson and Lord Tomlin
suggested that legislation should not be classified as ancillary to a federal
statute unless it was clear that the provincial legislature would refuse to pass
such legislation.""" Thus, where a province has enacted similar or identical
provisions to those which the federal authorities claim to be within the scope
of the necessarily incidental doctrine, the need for the federal provision no
longer exists. The concern or purpose that prompted the federal legislation
has been satisfied by valid provincial legislation. Of course, this raises the
question of what the result is where only some but not all of the provinces
have enacted similar legislation. Is the federal Act ultra vires in some
provinces and intra vires in others, or ultra vires in all or intra vires in all?
Again, as with the general trade and commerce power, the concern at
least of the majority of the Court appears to be directed to limiting federal
powers in the interest of preserving provincial powers. Although the concern
may be justified in that a broad interpretation of the necessarily incidental
doctrine results in converting mutually exclusive powers into concurrent
powers, any limitations or restrictions placed upon the doctrine ought surely
to be consistent both with the doctrine itself and with previous case authority.
Mr. Justice Estey's limited reference to the functional doctrine and his
rejection of it without reference to the post-1950 cases suggests the movement
to a new functional approach to "trade and commerce" may be reversed. The
danger with this approach is that not only would it strike down all compulsory
commodity standards legislation but also any voluntary commodity standards
legislation and might also render ineffective all forms of complementary
legislation. Adopting Estey J.'s analysis, what would happen if the provinces
repealed their legislation? Would the federal government be powerless to
protect the integrity of their standards? It would seem so.
The Chief Justice's apparent rejection of the doctrine based on the
existence of provincial legislation suggests a further limitation upon the
doctrine, one that can easily be used to advantage by a province. Since the
basis of the necessarily incidental doctrine is that both jurisdictions could pass
the legislation in question, the provinces now appear capable of rendering
federal legislation ultra vires by merely enacting identical provincial legis-
lation. Where before, the enactment of identical legislation by both the
provincial and federal legislatures resulted in at most a declaration of
inoperability with respect to the provincial legislation,8' it now appears
possible that the federal legislation will be declared ultra vires. On the other
78 [1912] A.C. 333 at 344-46, 1 D.L.R. 681 at 687-89, 13 C.R.C. 541 at 552-56.
7 9 A.G. Can. v. A.G.B.C., [1930] A.C. 111 at 121-22.
80 Browne, The Judicial Committee and the B.N.A. Act (Toronto: U. of Toronto
Press, 1967) at 137.
81 See, e.g., Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 593, 78
D.L.R. (3d) 701, 2 B.L.R. 129, (Div. Ct.); aff'd (1978), 86 D.L.R. (3d) 160 (C.A.).
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hand, one might argue that since the application of the necesarily incidental
doctrine results in federal legislative expropriation of provincial jurisdiction,
the need for the federal legislation should be clear and compelling. In the case
of agricultural products, because of the existence of provincial legislation,
that compelling need may no longer exist. However, should the provincial
legislation be repealed or not be enforced, then a compelling need for
federal legislation could be demonstrated.
VI. PROVINCIAL PARAMOUNTCY AND COLOURABILITY
The most interesting aspect of the Dominion Stores case, and one which
most clearly reflects the Court's concern not to interfere with provincial rights,
is the emphasis the majority places on the existence of provincial legislation
establishing standards for agricultural products. For the majority, the issue
before the court was not the question of whether Part I of the federal statute
was ultra vires the federal Parliament. According to Mr. Justice Estey, "The
precise issue facing the court in this proceeding is whether or not, in these
circumstances, a charge may be laid under the federal statute. '82 The decision
of the majority answers the latter question without specifically answering the
question of validity. Estey J. concludes his judgment by finding the federal
legislation "inapplicable. '83 Although Estey J. uses the phrase ultra vires,
it is not entirely clear whether he has found Part I ultra vires and therefore
inapplicable or merely inapplicable. He states:
It is not necessary to determine, in my view, whether Part I is ultra vires the
Parliament of Canada in toto and we are not invited by the appellant to do so. It
is sufficient if it is found to be inapplicable to the events as alleged in the charge
laid against the appellant under the federal statute. It may be that Part I has at least
a partial validity in that the grading program of s. 3 is integrated with the inter-
national and interprovincial trade program which is the subject of Part 11 of the
statute, but in my view, s. 3 has no validity in relation to purely intra-provincial
transactions and in that respect is ultra vires. This was the course followed in the
interpretation of legislation by Kellock, J., in somewhat similar circumstances in the
Reference as to the Applicability of The Minimum Wage Act of Saskatchewan to
an Employee of a Revenue Post Office, [1948] S.C.R. 248 at p. 268.84
His reference to the Saskatchewan Post Office case as a case of "similar
circumstances" further supports the view that to Estey J., and thus to the
majority, the issue is the applicability of legislation and not the validity of
legislation. In the Saskatchewan case, the issue was the applicability of valid
provincial minimum wage legislation to federal postal employees. Thus, by
analogy, the issue in the Dominion Stores case is the applicability of valid
federal legislation to local transactions."- If the distinction between legislation
82 Supra note 4, at 407 (N.R.), 289 (C.C.C.).
83 Id. at 412 (N.R.), 294 (C.C.C.).
84 Id. at 412-13 (N.R.), 294 (C.C.C.).
85 Estey J.'s reference to the Saskatchewan Post Office case as a case of similar
circumstance is also questionable. At issue in the Saskatchewan case was the matter of
inter-jurisdictional immunity, namely the extent to which the federal crown or its agencies
are bound by provincial legislation. No such issue arose in either Dominion Stores or
Labatt's. Further, in the Saskatchewan Post Office case provincial legislation was held to
be inapplicable whereas in Dominion Stores federal legislation was held to be inap-
plicable. Quaere whether the doctrine applies against federal legislation? See comments
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in relation to a matter and legislation which affects a matter is a valid
distinction, then it is inaccurate to say any federal legislation which affects
local transactions is ultra vires. It would appear, however, that Estey J. is
saying that any federal legislation which affects local transactions is in-
operative whenever valid provincial legislation on the same matter exists.
Certainly that appears to be the interpretation placed upon the majority
judgment by the dissenters. In his dissent in the Labatt's case the Chief
Justice referred to the decision of the majority in Dominion Stores in the
following terms:
I did not understand that the majority in the Dominion Stores case took any
position on the validity of Part I of the federal Act; rather that majority appeared
to find it inapplicable in the face of provincial legislation, a view which I, and
those who joined with me in dissent, did not share because it was our opinion that,
on the record, there was no issue raised as to the application of provincial
legislation.8 6
The result of Dominion Stores, the method of analysis adopted by the
majority, and the dissenter's interpretation of the judgment all appear to
suggest a new doctrine of interpretation for Canadian constitutional law: a
doctrine of provincial paramountcy.
Paramountcy is a constitutional doctrine used to reconcile conflicts
which arise when federal and provincial legislation meet. The present rule is
one of federal paramountcy; thus, when valid but inconsistent (or conflicting)
federal and provincial laws exist, the federal law prevails and the provincial
law is inoperative.87 However, it would appear from Dominion Stores that
it is now possible to assert a form of provincial paramountcy. The federal
legislation permitted the use of the established grade names; the provincial
legislation required the use of the established grade names. In Mr. Justice
Pigeon's view, it was this compulsion by provincial legislation that caused the
federal legislation to be inapplicable.
The retailers being compelled by the provincial statute to apply the grade name,
the federal inspectors claimed the equivalent in practical terms of the right to
enforce the provincial statute concerning grade requirements specifications, by
claiming violations of the federal standard. The conclusion of the majority in
this Court rejected this as unwarranted federal interference in what was in truth
the administration of the provincial statute. 88
As more figuratively put by Mr. Justice Estey: "[t]he parasite and not the
host thereby becomes the bigger and more important animal.189
by Pigeon J. in A.G. Que. and Keable v. A.G. Canada, [19791 1 S.C.R. 218 at 244-46,
90 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 181-83. 43 C.C.C. (2d) 49 at 69-71.
86 Supra note 5, at 535.
'4 First,.. . there can be a domain in which provincial and Dominion legislation
may overlap, in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires, if the field
is clear; and, secondly .... if the field is not clear, and in such a domain the
two legislations meet, then the Dominion legislation must prevail,
Grand Trunk Railway of Canada v. A.G. of Canada, [1907] A.C. 65 at 68, 7
C.R.C. 472 at 474.
1,8 Supra note 5, at 533.
s41 Supra note 4, at 407 (N.R.), 290 (C.C.C.).
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The theory of paramountcy per se does not require the resolution of
conflict in favour of the federal government, although all modem federal
constitutions adopt the rule of federal paramountcy.90 One could adopt a
rule of provincial paramountcy or a rule of mixed paramountcy, wherein
certain (or all) provincial powers would prevail over some federal powers,
but would not prevail over other federal powers. To a limited extent, pro-
vincial paramountcy may already exist in Canada with respect to old age
pensions. 91 To those persons who favour strong regional units and a less
powerful central government, provincial paramountcy would be a welcome
concept. The establishment of any such doctrine in Canada, however, raises
a number of general questions. What purpose is served in adopting two rules
of paramountcy? Is the doctrine to be applied universally or only to situations
in which a person could be charged under either a federal act or provincial
act for substantially the same offence? How do the two rules of paramountcy
interact? In applying the doctrine of federal paramountcy, the first step is to
independently determine the constitutional validity of the provincial and
federal acts in question and then, and only then, determine if they conflict.
In the Dominion Stores case, the reverse approach is adopted, as the federal
legislation is first characterized in light of the existing provincial legislation. 2
How important is the existence of uniform provincial legislation? Suppose, for
example, that some of the provinces had adopted different standards. Would
the differing provincial legislation result in a declaration of inapplicability for
some provinces but not for others?
These questions and many more are left unanswered in the Dominion
Stores case. What is clear from the case is the Court's concern with what has
been euphemistically called "federal intrusions"93 into provincial matters.
The Court was concerned that the federal legislation would render provincial
legislation "futile" or "ineffective," that federal "shadow legislation" could
frustrate provincial regulation of trade.9 4 It is submitted that these concerns
go to the wisdom of a particular piece of legislation and not to its consti-
tutionality. The courts have repeatedly stated that it is not their role to
comment upon the wisdom or propriety of any piece of legislation, yet the
tenor of the judgment is one of improper federal actions which, if permitted,
would destroy provincial legislative jurisdiction.
An alternative interpretation of the majority judgment in Dominion
Stores, which is consistent with past interpretative doctrines and permits the
Court to review the propriety of the legislation in question, is that the Court
applied the doctrine of colourability. This doctrine may be applied whenever
90 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977) at 102.
91 See s. 94A of the British North America Act, 1867, and comments thereon,
Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (4th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1975) at 24-25.
92 "The presence of the provincial Act did not itself invalidate the federal action,
but it farms part of the surroundings to be scrutinized in discerning the substantive core
of the federal legislation." Supra note 4, at 409 (N.R.), 291 (C.C.C.).
93 The phrase adopted by the western provincial Premiers in their report, Report on
the Western Premiers' Task Force on Constitutional Trends (Victoria: Queen's Printer,
1977).
94 Supra note 4, at 410 (N.R.), 292 (C.C.C.).
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a statute bears the formal trappings of a matter within the jurisdiction of the
legislature, but in reality is addressed to a matter outside the jurisdiction of
the legislature. The doctrine is expressly referred to by Mr. Justice Estey
when he explains why the Court must examine provincial legislation when
characterizing Federal legislation:
The court is, however, entitled, and indeed required, to examine the interrelation-
ship of federal and provincial legislation if it appears that Parliament has
incorporated provincial enactments into its own legislation in an effort to colour
(to adopt the language of the Privy Council) it so as to enter a field which, by
our constitution, rests solely within the legislative competence of the provinces.9 5
No reference was made in the judgment to the presumption of consti-
tutionality." It has been suggested by Professors Hogg9T and Abel98 that
application of the colourability doctrine should not be seen as the Court
attributing to the legislature improper motives. Yet the Court must invariably
do so as the doctrine is premised on the theory that although the legislation
in question appears valid and could properly fall within the Legislature's
powers, the legislation is invalid because the purpose intended was improper.
The Court in applying this doctrine must become involved in passing on the
wisdom of the legislation.09
Estey J. supports his interpretation by reference to the historical develop-
ment of the provincial and federal legislation. According to Professor Corry
in his study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial
Relations, both the provinces and the Dominion felt that the establishment
and maintenance of a uniform standard for agricultural products was bene-
ficial and that the Dominion government was the body equipped to co-
ordinate the matter.
However the confusion which differing provincial and federal grades and separate
uncoordinated administration would introduce into this field of regulation is so
great that the desirability of avoiding it is conceded everywhere as a matter of
principle.... Consequently, the provinces which have enacted separate legislation do
not propose to enact separate grades and a duplicating force of officials. Their in-
tention is to enact the federal grades and standards as their own and to appoint
Dominion inspectors and field staff as provincial officials.'00
Thus it was not a question of shadow federal legislation but shadow
provincial legislation. No province was compelled to adopt the federal
standard and Parliament is unlikely to adopt ten different standards in order
to claim a national standard. Thus, to characterize the federal Parliament's
actions as improper when it permits the standards it has established for
interprovincial trade to be used for intra-provincial trade (subject to a
penalty for misuse) and to ignore the province's original support of the federal
95 Id. at 406 (N.R.), 289 (C.C.C.).
06 Severn v. The Queen (1878), 2 S.C.R. 70, referred to in Re: N.S. Bd. of Censors
and McNeil (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 20 (S.C.C.).
97 Supra note 90, at 87.
98 Abel, The Neglected Logic of 91 and 92 (1969), 19 U. Toronto L.J. 487 at 494.
99 Laskin, Note on Canadian Constitutional Interpretation (1943-44), 5 U. Toronto
L.J. 171.
100 Corry, supra note 7, at 15.
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action is both unfortunate and unfair. Although legislative jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon one legislature by another, it is questionable to
attribute improper motives to one set of legislators when a scheme has been
adopted by both jurisdictions in an attempt to achieve that which neither
could achieve acting independently.
Whether it be called provincial paramountcy or colourability, the
technique of analyzing the applicability of federal legislation, given the
existence of provincial legislation, appears to be established in the Labatt's
and Dominion Stores cases. Even the minority in the Dominion Stores case
does not dismiss the importance of provincial legislation. The Chief Justice,
while upholding the validity of the federal legislation, suggested that a defence
of obedience to provincial legislation might be pleaded.' Whether this is
a defence founded upon some principle of constitutional law or a specific
example of some general criminal law defence' remains to be explained.
Subsequently in the Labatt's case the Chief Justice indicated that no issue
was raised in the Dominion Stores case as to the applicability of provincial
legislation, implying that the issue of constitutional validity of legislation
(which was the express question before the Court in Dominion Stores) can
be separated from the issue of the applicability of the legislation to a par-
ticular set of facts. 10:1 But this approach also implies that the existence of
provincial legislation may affect the interpretation or operability (as opposed
to the constitutionality) of federal legislation. The Chief Justice did not
reject the analysis of the majority in Dominion Stores upon any doctrinal
basis, but on the basis that no issue was raised as to the application of
provincial legislation. It is arguable, therefore, that to both the majority and
the minority the application of federal legislation may be dependent upon the
existence of provincial legislation. It appears that a doctrine of interpretation
substantially similar to a concept of provincial paramountcy has been
established.
VII. CONCLUSION
A review of the judgments of the Court in the Dominion Stores and
Labatt's cases clearly reveals the concern of the Court to protect those areas
of jurisdiction which are conceded to be contained within section 92 of the
B.N.A. Act. To a majority of the Court provincial control over local trade is
of paramount concern, a matter which must be protected from federal
legislative intrusions at all costs. Thus, the emasculation of the federal general
trade power, the restrictive interpretation of the necessarily incidental
doctrine and the creation of a concept of provincial paramountcy are justi-
fied on the basis that federal legislation which affects local trade must be at
least ineffective if not invalid.
"t""What the appellant's legal position would have been if it had claimed by way
of defence that it was obeying provincial legislation is not a question that arises here, and
I leave it open." Supra note 4. at 421 (N.R.), 284 (C.C.C.).
102 For example, an application of the defence of due diligence to an offence of
strict liability.
1 3 Supra note 5, at 535.
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Although Professor Hogg in his article on the constitutional bias of
the Supreme Court concluded that "there is no basis for the claim that the
Court has been biased in favour of the federal interest in constitutional
legislation," 1 4 he also found that from December 23rd, 1949105 to June 1st,
1979, of the thirty-seven federal statutes challenged in the Supreme Court of
Canada only four were held to be unconstitutional in whole or in part,
whereas twenty-five of sixty-five provincial statutes were found unconsti-
tutional or inoperative. In a period of approximately six months the Supreme
Court has invalidated or struck down three federal statutes in whole or in
part,"" almost equalling the number that were struck down in the previous
thirty-one years. In each case strong arguments could have been advanced
and were advanced in favour of the legislation. It is submitted that these
cases are important not so much for the doctrinal positions developed therein
(for if anything they confuse rather than clarify the law), but for the new
attitude of the Court reflected in the judgments. It is an attitude which suggests
a return to the "provincial rights" philosophy of the Privy Council period
according to which those matters which are clearly seen to be within
provincial competence, such as local trade, are to remain immune from any
federal legislative power.
104 Hogg, supra note 1. at 739.
11" The date of abolition of appeals to the Privy Council.
1"1M In addition to Dominion Stoies and Labatt's, the Supreme Court in Fowler v.
The Queen (1980). 32 N.R. 230. 119801 5 W.W.R. 511, held that s. 33(3) of the federal
Fisheries Act was ultra vires the federal Parliament. During this time period the Supreme
Court also held federal proposals which would have substantially altered the nature of
the Senate to be ultra vires: Reference Re Legislative Authority of Parliament to Alter
or Replace The Senate. [1980) 1 S.C.R. 54. 102 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
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